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ABSTRACT
Situating Structural Violence Within Peace:
a Critical Study of Peacebuilding in Rwanda and Cambodia
by
S.L. Reeder, Master of Arts
Utah State University, 2015
Major Professor: Dr. Colin Flint
Department: Political Science
Many peace agreements fail despite external mediation and intervention, prompting a
deconstruction of the predominant conceptions of peace and methods of peacebuilding.
Of the weaknesses of these conceptions, the lack of concern for post-conflict structural
violence is one of the strongest, and the main focus of this research. Infant mortality rate
variations demonstrate the salience of structural violence in post-conflict situations.
Further, to look deeper at the weaknesses of the hegemonic ideals on peace and its
implementation by external actors, the cases of Rwanda and Cambodia are analyzed
using the comparative method, and situated within critical peace literature. The
comparison finds that rapid military integration may cause violence to restart, and that
non-state entities appear more likely to be disarmed than recognized states during the
post-conflict phase. This research also suggests that not disarming rebels in the peace
process is an indication of a move towards a more just and inclusive society that will lead
to a decrease in both direct and indirect violence, including a decrease in structural
violence as indicated by a decline in the infant mortality rate.
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Situating Structural Violence Within Peace:

a Critical Study of Peacebuilding in Rwanda and Cambodia

S.L. Reeder

Many peace agreements fail despite external mediation and intervention. This research
delves into why that may be, by scrutinizing UN involvement in the resolution of two
conflicts, Rwanda and Cambodia. These conflicts were selected due to their similarly
high death rates, and their official cease-fires in the early 1990s. Further, the agreement
in Cambodia was successful, while the one in Rwanda failed, resulting in the 1994
genocide. Through comparative analysis, it is found that structural problems in the
agreements lead to discontent. The issue that appears most salient in the failed Rwandan
agreement is the fast timeline for military integration. Thus this research concludes that
immediate or rapid military integration or demobilization, may destabilize the peace
process.
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INTRODUCTION

There is a problem with the way we have been pursuing peace: our efforts have
not broken the cycle of violence. Evidence can be found in the continuing violence in
Israel/Palestine, or the recurrence of violence for generations in African nations such as
Liberia, or the particularly haunting genocide in Rwanda. The United Nations and others
often intervene in conflicts, or assist in implementing cease-fires, but the cease-fires are
all too often short lived. Our ability to ensure lasting peace appears to be failing.
One part of the problem, is the focus on old practices intended for interstate war.
Since the trailing end of the Cold War, internal conflict, rather than interstate conflict, has
been predominant. From 1975 to 2011, 173 conflicts were logged by the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program (UCDP), of which 150 were intrastate (Högbladh, 2011, p. 43).
These conflicts may be less sensational than major interstate wars, yet are particularly
problematic due to their common recurrence, even following peace agreements.
The current “liberal” model does produce positive results on occasion. Truly,
violence has declined overall, yet local dissatisfaction has increased. “So far the liberal
peace project has not been subject to a concerted ethical consideration over the last two
decades. Instead, its legitimacy tends to rest on past glories or on the praxis of already
peaceful liberal polities” (Richmond, 2009, p. 558).
In an effort to ameliorate, break, or at least attenuate, the aforementioned cycle of
civil war the United Nations has implemented new programs such as DDR
(Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration), and has pushed for rapid
democratization and liberalization. Nonetheless, many of the conflicts in which these
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programs have been tried have fallen prey to the same cycle of recurrence. Clearly,
either the programs are either poorly designed or the resources to properly undertake such
programs are inadequate. For instance, despite multiple peacekeeping operations in
Liberia, conflict kept reoccurring, as the goals the UN set for themselves did not reflect
the breadth and severity of the conflict (McFate, 2010). This research suggests that
disarmament has a negative effect on the post-conflict stage, increasing indirect and
direct violence, and particularly structural violence, as seen in infant mortality rate
increases.

The Comparison

In this research, two well-known, but little understood, conflicts resolved in recent
decades will be compared. This comparison will demonstrate some of the problems to
which the current paradigm of peace making is subject. First among these is Rwanda.
Two ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi, were often in conflict. In 1990, exiled Tutsi
invaded Rwanda from the refugee camps in Uganda to reclaim their homeland, leading to
a short and bloody war, before a cease-fire in 1993. In 1994, before the Arusha Accords
could be implemented, Hutu militias broke the peace, and began a mass genocide of
Tutsi. In response, the invading Tutsi exiles resumed their war and had subdued the
whole country within four months. Interestingly, after the takeover, the conflict never
restarted. Moreover, Rwanda has since distinguished itself from other sub-Saharan states
by reducing its infant mortality rate drastically, as well as becoming a shining beacon to

3
the world by having more than fifty percent female representation in parliament, the
highest in the world (World Bank, 2015)1.
The second is Cambodia. Cambodia underwent continual upheaval after its
independence from France in the 1950s, including mass killings in the 1970s. From 1978
to 1990, Cambodia experienced a civil war, which is the focus of this study. The 1990
Paris Accords ended the conflict, and it did not restart. Unlike Rwanda though, infant
mortality actually rose for some time after the conflict ended, before eventually
beginning to reduce again (World Bank, 2015).
These two conflicts show an interesting mix of failure and success. Particularly,
the lack of improvement in conditions, proxied by infant mortality rates, in the
supposedly peaceful Cambodia, suggest that there may be more to peace than just a lack
of direct violence. Indeed, other scholars such as Galtung (1969) and Farmer (2004) have
suggested that another type of violence exists, known as structural violence. Structural
violence is the systematic disadvantage experienced by the individuals and groups within
a country due to the social, political, and economic structures of that country. This
research analyses structural violence through infant mortality rates, finding that infant
mortality rate increases are often indicative of significant short to medium-term political
turmoil in the periphery of the world economy.
Following the analysis of structural violence, the two conflicts are compared to
determine some of the reasons why one agreement failed, while the other did not.

Sex ratios account for at least some of this, as Rwanda’s ratio is .87 males per female for those between
55 and 64, and .7 for those 65 and over, the ages likely to be in political roles. Nevertheless, this sex ratio
is not necessarily a predictor of high female representation, as Benin has a similar ratio, but exhibits only
7% female representation, one of the lowest in the world. While this high level may not last as the sex
ratios even out in the future, the progress is nonetheless remarkable.
1
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Among the notable differences, it appears that overly rapid military integration of rebels
and loyalists may make violence more likely to break out again, as happened in Rwanda.
Additionally, non-state actors appear to be treated differently than those recognized as
legitimate. However, in Cambodia, both sides were recognized by separate portions of
the international community, breaking from the norm of the international community
only recognizing the reigning government. The recognition of the non-state entity in the
Cambodian conflict dyad may be important in the acceptability of the terms, and the
general feeling of increased respect the effected groups would feel in negotiations, and in
the post-conflict landscape.
To reach the aforementioned conclusions, the research goes through the following
steps. First, the basic history of each conflict is established. Then the literature is
consulted to determine the history of peace, its meaning/s, the post-Cold War
applications, and the theoretical reasons why those applications are helpful or not in
creating and maintaining peace. Next, the research analyzes infant mortality rates in
conflict-affected countries, establishing the link between structural violence and infant
mortality rate changes. Then the agreements and implementations of Cambodia and
Rwanda are compared and analyzed to determine which areas are similar, and more
importantly, in which causal areas the two differ. The resultant areas in which the two
differ having already been detailed.

Discontent with the liberal model for peace
The “liberal” model of peace has experienced broad acceptance over the last
several decades. At times, it has been considered at odds with realist ideals such as the
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hegemonic peace, where peace is guaranteed by a dominant power and supposedly stable
hierarchy. In the post-Cold War era though, the liberal model has extended to the view
that liberal internationalist norms of individual rights supersede the realist ideal of state
sovereignty (Chandler, 2004).
Individual rights and human rights are often cited by supporters of the liberal
internationalist system to justify interventions, such as in Libya in 2011 by France, or
even at the prospect of invading Iraq in 2003. These interventions; however, only serve
to support the new balance of power (Chandler, 2004). Further, the standardization of
prescriptions for peace has repeatedly failed to deliver a peace that is widely enjoyed by
those in the affected areas (Mac Ginty, 2008). Hegre (2000), through his research, finds
that only equally developed states enjoy peace through the liberal model of
interdependence. On the other hand, less developed states often experience conflict with
more developed states, due to a simple rule that Hegre (2000) discovered: The utility of
occupation is negatively correlated with development levels, just as the cost of invasion is
positively correlated with the same. Thus the liberal world economy, as interconnected
as it is, may promote conflict with the least developed countries, and still favor the most
developed, despite intentions.
Perhaps the most influential of contemporary dissenters is Richmond (2009;
2013). The failings of the model, Richmond (2013) claims, are due to the local
dissatisfaction with the externally imposed process: Specifically, the assumption that
whatever works in the West must work everywhere else is not valid. The liberal model
also ignores the fact that the West got to where it is after long periods of very slow
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change, rather than in a single sweeping change. Yet it is that sweeping change that is
imposed to create more states in the West’s image (Richmond, 2013; 2009).
Sweeping change might not be an issue if changes worked exactly as planned.
However, recent research has shown that democratization and marketization too early in
the post-war phase lead to instability, and that instability often leads to ethnic dominance
(Paris, 2004, p. 175). This does not seem as much of a problem if the hegemonic model
is to be believed, where a dominant group with a monopoly on the use of force is
considered inherently stable, think Tutsi supremacy over the Hutu. In spite of this claim,
Collier and Hoeffler (2004, p. 588), have shown that ethnic dominance is the most likely
grievance to lead to a recommencement of violence following a peace agreement.
Richmond further argues that the peace and state building processes imposed by
the United Nations and other Western entities are not tailored to the specific context. To
succeed, he claims, the peace process must engage with the “everyday” (Richmond,
2009, p. 568). By this, he means that while the West stresses first security and then
institutional establishment via a constitution, the everyday existence of the population
either remains insecure or worsens. Thus, the West ignores human security to establish
institutional security, thereby inviting structural violence, as the structures remain
inadequate to meet the needs of the populace as a whole, and meet only those of the
elites, or of the dominant ethnicity (Richmond, 2009).
The untailored peace process lacks both efficacy and legitimacy, leading at best to
a “virtual peace” (Richmond, 2009, p. 565). Instead, what is needed is a “willingness to
recognize local ownership, human rights, culture, social and grassroots resources for selfgovernment as significant even in relation to the priorities of military or institutional
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capacities and international order” (Richmond, 2009, p. 565). Hence, one could claim
that where the Liberian DDR process went wrong was by working from the top down,
rather than the bottom up. While the focus in Liberia was on getting the militias to
demobilization areas, and to give up their weapons, which was much delayed and only
with reluctance performed, the focus should have been on immediate integration of the
militia into everyday life.

Origins of the conflicts in Cambodia and Rwanda
In the late 19th century, Germany finally entered Africa to colonize and administer
lands like the other European powers were already doing. In the Great Lakes region of
East Africa, the Germans found a small but profitable area useful for producing coffee.
Based upon their European ideological heritage, the Germans felt that a hierarchical
system would be beneficial to stability and to the retention of German colonial interests
(Smith, 1995). To do this the German administrators looked at the existing structure,
which consisted of an agricultural economy based upon farming and herding. Due to the
inherent value of livestock compared to land, herders were already considered of higher
status than field workers. Based upon this, the German administrators began by giving
important government positions to the herders, giving them a vested interest in stability
and German colonial rule. The herders became known as the Tutsi, and were much
smaller in number than the farmers, who became known as the Hutu (Paris, 2004).
During World War I the German Army in continental Europe invaded and
occupied neighboring Belgium. Unable to oust the German military from their
homeland, the Belgian forces in Africa decided to claim German African holdings. One
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of these was what is now Rwanda. Following the war, Germany forfeited all rights to
overseas holdings, and thus the restored Belgium officially inherited the lands it had
taken from the Germans in Africa. In order to solidify their own rule the Belgians opted
to use the same already solidifying divide to determine ability to hold key positions.
However, the economy had changed enough that the farmer/herder divide was no longer
as salient. Instead, they kept the same names for the divides, but would make judgments
based on nose measurements and height, to classify individuals (Paris, 2004).
By the time European colonies began to gain independence in the 1950s, the
divide and the discontent between the two groups had grown to the point of violence.
The majority Hutu had been unhappy about their political exclusion for some time, and
the Belgians expected to withdraw soon, making the Hutu feel emboldened. In 1956, two
years before gaining independence, a majority Hutu militia overthrew the Tutsi king, and
the Belgians did next to nothing to push back. The coup also triggered a wave of
violence in the country, causing at least 150,000 mostly Tutsi to flee to neighboring
Uganda (Smith, 1995; World Bank, 2015)
Although most of the country's Tutsi population remained in their homes in
Rwanda, the refugees who had crossed into Uganda did not feel safe coming home.
Instead they stayed in Uganda, but were not welcomed there either. They were forced to
live in isolated communities, which increased their levels of ideological encapsulation
(Della Porta, 2013), eventually leading to the formation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF), a military organization with the intent of retaking Rwanda. The fledgling RPF
often found work fighting for one side or the other in local disputes, but as the population
grew, and was still not integrated, the dream of reclaiming their homeland transformed
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into a necessity. In 1990, the RPF crossed the border from Uganda, intent on ousting the
reigning Hutu majority government (Smith, 1995).
For two years the war continued, until a tentative ceasefire in 1992. The United
Nations then began mediating talks between the two groups in Arusha Tanzania, and in
August of 1993, a peace agreement was signed by both parties. This agreement failed
however, when the airplane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot
down by an unknown party in early 1994. Hutu militias in the capital city of Kigali
began killing Tutsi civilians in retaliation, and the violence spread (Paris, 2004; Smith,
1995).
According to Paris (2004), the failure of the Arusha accords was due to local
dissatisfaction with the terms and with the United Nations Assistance Mission for
Rwanda (UNAMIR). UNAMIR was to ensure the security of the capital, Kigali, as well
as to implement military reforms, which included demobilization. In addition, the
economy had been experiencing net shrinkage since 1990 as a result of both the upheaval
and the crash of coffee prices. With coffee as Rwanda’s most important export, this put
them in a very tight position, yet at the same time, UNAMIR was pushing economic
liberalization.
When the mission ended in 1996 after having been gutted and determined
ineffective (UN, 1996), the RPF government was left without help from the United
Nations (Makinda, 1996). Fortunately, many RPF members resided in neighboring
countries such as Uganda, which gave those countries a vested interest in Rwandan
stability. Only later did the UN assist in the “Culture of Peace” program in Rwanda and
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Nicaragua, which was intended to build up private civic organizations, and has been
shown to be a helpful precursor to democratization (Paris, 2004, p. 175).

Cambodia
Cambodia’s proximity to the waterway between the Indian and Pacific Oceans
has led to a long history of outside influences and exploitation. This is evidenced by their
historic subjugation by the Siamese, influence from the Chinese, and ultimately, the long
French Protectorate of the 19th and 20th centuries. This protectorate was temporarily
interrupted from 1941-1945 due to World War II, when the Japanese military occupied
the territory, along with much of East Asia (Curtis, 1998; Kiernan, 2014).
In 1946 when the French returned after the end of the Japanese occupation, many
things changed. Though independence did not arrive for several more years, a new
constitution allowed for the first political parties and elections. Nevertheless, a number
of Cambodian communists were not pleased with French rule, and formed the first in a
string of guerrilla resistance groups which would plague the country for the next few
decades (Curtis, 1998; Kiernan, 2014).
In 1953, the kingdom of Cambodia officially gained independence from France,
and in 1955, King Siouhanouk abdicated the throne in favor of his father, but quickly
became Prime Minister himself. Siouhanouk would be one of the most important figures
in Cambodia for many years to come, even from exile at certain points (Kiernan, 2014).
For ten years, there was relative peace in Cambodia, but in 1965, the Cambodian
Government allowed the North Vietnamese guerillas to operate in their territory. This
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relationship continued until 1970, when a coup established the Khmer Republic, which
actively fought against the North Vietnamese (Curtis, 1998; Kiernan, 2014).
The coup may well have been helped along by the initial decision of the Kingdom
of Cambodia to tacitly assist the North Vietnamese. As a result of that decision, the
United States undertook many covert operations and bombing campaigns in Cambodia in
1969. While these were primarily against the North Vietnamese guerrillas, they likely
assisted in fueling the dissatisfaction and fluidity of power that led to the 1970 coup
(Curtis, 1998; Kiernan, 2014).
Following this coup, the former king and Prime Minister Siouhanouk escaped to
China, where he formed the Khmer Rouge as a communist guerrilla movement.
Meanwhile the Khmer Republic began actively fighting the North Vietnamese who were
operating in Cambodian Territory. However, they did not fare well against the two
enemies of the Khmer rouge (Kiernan, 2014).
In 1975, the Khmer Rouge staged a successful coup. This brought Siouhanouk back, but
also brought in foreign educated intellectuals like Pol Pot. This group of intellectuals
was influenced largely by the French Communists, who had taken up the cause of the
Viet Minh, the Vietnamese faction recognized as the legitimate government by the
USSR. Eventually these individuals worked their way into the many revolutionary
groups of Cambodia, and then threw their weight behind the Khmer Rouge (Kiernan,
2014).
Following the coup, many urban citizens of Cambodia were forced to move to the
countryside. This was part of an effort to return Cambodia to a more agrarian society,
like it had been in the middle ages. Unfortunately there were far too many people living
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in Cambodia for this to work, and many starved, while others were killed for dissent, real
or suspected, leading to a death toll of approximately 1.7 million in the next few years
(Kiernan, 2014).
Amidst the killing and starvation, a minority of Vietnamese descent living within
Cambodia fared worse than the rest. This was partially due to Khmer Rouge government
suspicion that the Vietnamese planned on creating a larger Indochinese union under the
aegis of Vietnam.2 Within two years, border skirmishes had begun with Vietnam, and
finally in 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia (Curtis, 1998; Kiernan, 2014).
The symmetric portion of the conflict lasted only until the next year, when the
Vietnamese took the capital and established territorial dominance. The Vietnamese ran
the country for a short while until a pro-Vietnam government was elected in 1981.
Nonetheless, the new government was not recognized, and Siouhanouk and the exiled
Khmer Rouge retained the United Nations seat. Over the next eight years, the conflict
between the pro-Vietnamese government and the Vietnamese still occupying the country,
and the government in exile displaced hundreds of thousands of people, adding to the
instability and fueling further conflict (Curtis, 1998).
In 1989 however, the government opted to abandon socialism in order to attract
foreign investment. This coincided with the beginning of peace talks in Paris, and with
the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces. By 1991, the peace agreement was signed, and the
peace was more or less durable. Siouhanouk returned and became King in the new
regime (Curtis, 1998).

2

These fears were exacerbated by the circumstances in Vietnam immediately preceding the Khmer Rouge
takeover. In 1973 the United States and North Vietnam signed a cease-fire, in 1974 the United States
pulled out its remaining troops, and then from 1974 to 1975 the North Vietnamese broke the cease fire and
conquered South Vietnam with impunity (Kiernan, 2014).
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Determining problems in the predominant views of peace, in addition to research,
needs to be situated in the literature. Namely, the definitions of peace must be discussed,
as well as what several scholars say on how peace is achieved. Defining what one means
by peace might seem trivial, but the discussion to follow demonstrates that there are very
different meanings and understandings.
Dietrich (2006) outlines the development of the common conception of peace. In
Ancient Greece, Circa 600 BCE, the beginnings of the current understanding arose. The
concepts of a singular truth, and a singular order are guaranteed by power within the city
state system. The concept was reinforced by the theology of the day, where Peace was
deified in the goddess Eirene. According to how peace was accomplished, Eirene was
the daughter of Zeus and the titaness Themis, who represented power, and order,
respectively. Thus Peace was the product of Power and Order.
As a result of this conception of peace through power and order, there is a phobic
sense of security to protect the institution of the city-state. Dietrich (2006) terms this
Phobos, and extends this concept to organized religions over the ages, and finally to the
current states-system.
This monological and reductive variant of peace spread around the
Mediterranean, but did not quickly catch on elsewhere. This allowed for an internally
efficient region, but divided them from rest of the world, who still thought of truth as
subjective and multiple. The divide often led to conflict, even though it reduced internal
conflict. The relationship between systems can be demonstrated more recently by the
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failed democratic peace theory, where democracies are less likely to fight each other, but
more likely to fight non-democracies (Dietrich, 2006).
The Greek development is described as a transition from the previous, magical
world view, to a mystical one; where the magical view is/was energetic. Energetic is the
term Dietrich (2006) uses, but can also be read as agonistic. The magical view
represented the existence of multiple competing views, all in competition with one
another, but not necessarily attempting to dominate the others, simply existing in
competition (Dietrich, 2006; Shinko, 2008).
The magical world may not have been entirely chaotic, as one might suspect due
to the variety of views. Some level of conflict has actually been suggested to be a
positive thing, keeping the social order more fluid and maintaining pluralism, which can
protect from political ossification, which is a particular danger in the periphery of the
world economy (Jones, 2014; Mouffe, 2005, p. 32).
In northern Europe, the magical worldview never went away, and seems to have
coexisted after the introduction the mystical worldview with Christianity. The most
salient example of this is the German word for peace, friede, which traditionally meant to
treat as kin. This understanding of peace required the respect and recognition of the
other, rather than merely toleration. Nevertheless, the northern European understanding
was superseded by the more hegemonic Mediterranean one (Dietrich, 2006).
Hegemony, or the political dominance of one political entity over others as
prescribed by the Greek understanding of peace, persisted for millennia as the primary
manner in which peace was maintained. Additionally, though hegemony spread its
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tendrils throughout the world, the country in the position of dominance, the hegemon, has
almost invariably been a European power (Dietrich, 2002, p. 50).
The idea of hegemonic peace went more or less unchallenged until the mid-20th
century. And only after two world wars, did challenging the hegemonic conception of
peace become acceptable. The challenge did not stop there though, as it also became
more common to posit the presence of a hegemon as the root cause of the recurrence of
violence. One of the earliest and most influential authors to do this was Johan Galtung
(1969), who introduced the idea of two types of peace: negative and positive. The newly
posited model suggested that while hegemony may reduce direct violence, it ignored the
negative effects of the underlying structure of the capitalist world-economy within which
the processes of hegemony occur. This political structure closely mirrors the world
economy through core-periphery dynamics (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 57), where the negative
effects of said structure were dubbed “structural violence”, by Galtung (1969, p. 171).
While direct violence is bodily harm done intentionally, by one upon another,
structural violence is the disadvantage experienced by individuals and groups due to the
operation of the political and economic structures3. For example, in order to achieve
stability, the Germans and Belgians created a micro hegemony between the cattle herders
and the farmers of the African Great Lakes Region, giving positions of power and
dominance to the former. Over the years however, the descendants of those original
farmers became more and more disadvantaged due to structural violence. While it may
be true that this structure prevented direct violence for a time, the structural violence
continued until the divide was so severe that direct violence began. Additionally,

“…when one husband beats his wife there is a clear case of personal violence, but when one million
husbands keep one million wives in ignorance there is structural violence.”
3
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research has shown that many of the specific methods of preventing direct violence, such
as sanctions, often enhance the structural violence toward already disenfranchised groups
(Galtung, 1969; Høivik, 1977, p. 59). This study suggests that disarmament will do the
same.
Structural violence may seem difficult to measure, but in reality, a number of
common indicators can give one a sense of structural violence. Among these are natal
indices like preterm birth rates, low birth weight rates, and rates of caesarian section
(Bodalal et al, 2013); or post-natal infant mortality rates, as children and mothers are
particularly susceptible to day-to-day stresses. Other methods, such as those used by
Høivik and Galtung (1971), measure productivity and lowered life expectancy through
indices like the number of days of lives lost, counting both the reduction in life
expectancy and the extra time needed by some groups to accomplish life tasks as
compared to other groups.
According to Galtung (1969), Negative peace is the lack of direct violence.
Contrarily, positive peace is the lack of structural violence, which is much harder to
achieve, let alone to measure. While negative peace can be measured easily by the lack
or presence of direct violence, positive peace requires indirect measurement through
indicators of increased stresses due to inequalities between groups. This is also known as
horizontal inequality, differentiating it from intragroup, or vertical inequality (Galtung,
1969; Wæver, 2008, p. 103).
Additionally, unlike direct violence, which is done by a specific actor, structural
violence is exerted systematically. That is, structural violence is exerted indirectly by
everyone in a particular social order. This spread of blame can provoke discomfort in our
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moral economy, which is still geared toward pinning praise or blame on individual actors,
rather than the system (Farmer et al, 2004, p. 2).
In this research, structural violence will be measured through infant mortality
rates, due to the availability of reliable historical data from the World Bank (2015).
While infant mortality rates are dropping worldwide, and since 1960 there is not a single
country where the rate is higher now than it was then, temporary increases are shown
during and after significant political change. In the former Soviet Republics this change
was due to the drastic change in government type; because these all happened at roughly
the same time, it is unlikely that there is an intervening variable. Another type of
political change, conflict and conflict resolution, also exhibits similar temporary increases
in infant mortality rates. These correlations, while not thoroughly tested here, appear to
happen in the same circumstances often enough to believe they are not spurious.

Post-Cold-War peace programs

While the omnibenevolence of hegemonic stability may be questioned now by
some, it still has many proponents (Keohane, 1980). Additionally, standard programs
intended to help with the peace process that were begun when the theory was
unquestioned, remain, and only recently has there been a self-conscious study of how to
keep conflicts from restarting once they stop.
One of these issues, which has become salient in recent decades, has been the lack
of integration of former combatants into the post-conflict political, cultural, and
economic scenes. Even in the framework of hegemonic security this is problematic, as
these combatants may threaten the monopoly on the use of force. Additionally, a lack of
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integration leaves the non-integrated groups at a disadvantage, yielding structural
violence. Early programs attempted to remedy this by disarming and demobilizing
combatants compulsorily, but this led to another problem; regardless of whether they had
been disarmed and demobilized, former combatants without steady work in the aftermath
of conflict contribute still to instability and insecurity (McFate, 2010, p. 1).
In acknowledgement of this problem, more recent cases have attempted to
maintain security through either military integration or police reform, trying to keep at
least some of the former combatants employed and engaged. Military integration of both
sides in a conflict has better short term effectiveness according to Call (2012), as the
combatants are retained on the payroll. Integration is much preferable to flooding the
countryside with unemployed individuals already desensitized to violence. However,
military security structures are not especially effective at maintaining the internal wellbeing of a state, and could thus increase structural violence, as soldiers are more likely to
commit acts of violence upon citizens than are police forces.
Police reform, is more effective in the long-term at reducing structural violence,
so long as each group feels equally protected. The weakness though, is that it both takes
a longer time to establish a sense of security, and is not able to directly employ the former
combatants without time consuming retraining and restructuring (Call, 2012, pp. 215216)

19
Economics of love and fear
While Call’s (2012) examples of security cooperation are a useful starting point, it
must be situated within an understanding of how the particulars of any restructuring will
affect the population’s emotional, as well as physical well-being, and thus the levels of
structural violence experienced. The important thing is that it is not what happens to
someone that causes a violent reaction or lack thereof now or down the road, but the way
they feel about what has happened to them. In order to maintain positive peace, requiring
the lack of structural violence, and less directly negative peace, there must be a
perception of genuine community between groups, not just within them (Lederach, 1999).
This genuine community leads to a sustainable, positive, “justpeace”, according to
Lederach (1999). In Moral Imagination, Lederach (1999) attempts to shed light on how
this type of community can be rebuilt, implying that the breakdown of the community
was the cause of the conflict, or at least made the groups more vulnerable to conflict.
The way to do this might not be obvious though. As a greater society, we are well
equipped to understand and undertake efforts to stop painful and undesired things, like
direct violence, but are not as well equipped to build, change, or rebuild the desired
cultural norms, structures, and policies that would promote sustained cooperation, and
prevent a return to violence (Lederach, 2005).
To create a theory of justpeace, and how to achieve it or not, Lederach (1999)
borrows from Boulding’s (1990) work on grants economics. Boulding (1990) considered
every interaction between groups of people, and even individuals, to be an economic
exchange. While the motivation for the interaction could be monetary, as in traditional
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economics, Boulding (1990) argued that the fact that there was a motivating factor, or
type of power, united them.
Boulding (1990) outlined three types of power which motivated the exchange of
grants; threat power, economic power, and integrative power. Grants are the exchange of
goods, services, or concessions. Threat power relies upon the fear of punishment to elicit
the exchange, economic power promises a substantive or monetary reward, while
integrative power implies a deepening of connections between the parties and a mutual
benefit. Metaphorically, these types of power are often referred to as “the stick, the
carrot, and the hug” respectively (Boulding, 1990, p. 10).
Grants motivated by either the threat system or the integrative have opposing
outcomes with regard to their emotional reception. Those motivated by the threat system
foster discontent non-cohesion, and distrust, even if no physical action is taken as a
result. Contrarily, integrative grant foster cohesion, contentment, and trust (Boulding,
1981, p. iv).
Lederach (2005), took these dichotomous outcomes, which Boulding (1990) often
called fear and love, and extended them to a framework for the analysis of post-conflict
interactions. This framework centers on the visualization of a continental divide, with
water flowing in two directions away from it toward separate shores. One shore
represents fear, while the other represents love. Should water flow toward the fearcoast,
as it does when there is a threat based exchange, the relationship between the groups is
defined by certain negative aspects. First, recrimination and the exchange of blame
between parties. Second, self-justification and protection, where confirmation bias yields
defensive escalation. Third, violence, as groups act on the continuing fear. Fourth,
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victory, whereby the desire for dominance of the self over the other rises to its greatest
degree (Lederach, 2005, p. 42).
Should the water flow toward the lovecoast, the relationship is defined by
positive aspects. First, openness, as each group stops hiding what they do. Second,
accountability, as they begin to feel trust, ultimately leading to self-reflection and
vulnerability, which can be seen as the opposite of self-justification and protection.
Where it is now acceptable to be vulnerable to possible violence, instead of protecting
oneself against it to the extent that the other does not trust the self. Third, dignity, as
each group feel respected and self-assured when faced by the other. Fourth, proactive
engagement of the other, which is the mechanism through which the groups can maintain
healthy relationships (Lederach, 2005, p. 43).
Where fear destroys, love builds. The latter must be emphasized to garner peace,
but it is not always obvious which actions create which emotional reactions. A simple
example of these exchanges in action is World War I, and the prior practice of extracting
the cost of the war from the losing party. By doing this, the victor blames the loser for
the damage, and the loser blames the victor for their subsequent poverty. This is most
evident in the example of Germany, where reparations were to be paid to France and
others, but the economy was subsequently wrecked. Additionally, Germany was limited
in its ability to have an organized and armed military4. These terms, tied with local and
world conditions, paved the way for extremist groups to vie for power, and created a deep
sense of othering, helping the nationalists to take power (Carr, 1940).
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Poverty like that of the Germans, blamed by the Germans on the French, and to
some extent the Jews, only heightens when the loser is held monetarily responsible, even
while the victor becomes more and more resolute that their cause was just. That poverty
was due to the structure of the peace agreement, and thus the Second World War,
happened at least partly due to structural violence against the losers of the First World
War If this continues, it risks creating just the reactive protectionism in both sides that it
did cause in Germany and France, and the desire of the Germans to reverse the
dominance. The winner wishes to preserve the status quo by denying the vanquished the
means to challenge their supremacy, while the loser becomes more and more
discontented, and wishes to regain its strength and respectability (Lederach, 2005, p. 49).

Disarmament, othering, and thirdness

Throughout the aforementioned peace literature, there is mention of cleavage, and
of fear, both of which are ways of explaining the self-other, or in-group out-group
dichotomies, as well as the structural violence that results. Feminist understandings of
peace point out the benefit of understanding the other, which can be done through the use
of storytelling and listening, to create an emphatic space where violence and peace can
coexist. New understandings allow one to take a step back from one’s own prejudices and
the concerns of the other, achieving a state of thirdness, and ideally, a subsequent
reduction in structural violence (Lau and Seedat, 2013).
The common perception otherwise is that the other is horrible, and the self is
good, and thus violence, direct or structural, is perpetuated. The artificial self-other
dichotomy, though useful for in-group cooperation, is the prime cause of intergroup
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violence (Lau & Seedat, 2013). The empathic space concept meshes nicely with
Dietrich’s conception of an energetic peace, as well as Shinko’s agonistic peace, but
continues further, to show specifically how to break through the idea of a singular truth
(Dietrich, 2006; Shinko, 2008).
The self-other, also known as in-group, out-group dichotomy can be both
understood and deconstructed via storytelling, as stories allow us to empathize with the
structural violence each group experiences. Stories allow us to understand the local view,
rather than “cold” metrics of the supposed causes of conflict. The idea of empathic
coexistence of peace and conflict is thirdness; a way to recognize and accommodate
differences without needing to resolve the tensions first. Essentially, empathic space
allows for a “mutuality of peace and violence” (Lau & Seedat, 2013, p. 485). This
“mutuality” allows one to understand what the other side believes the trouble to be.
A number of types of exchanges relevant to conflict recommencement have their
roots in othering. Exclusion of formerly warring parties from power is much more
significant in the recurrence of conflict than the traditionally blamed factors, such as
poverty, resource dependency, or state capacity (Call, 2012, p. 216). Any fear, whether
or not substantiated, that former combatants are rearming, or a neighboring community
arming for the first time, regardless of previous coexistence, can easily bring the peace
process to a halt (Wallensteen, 2002, pp. 287-288).
Disarmament, as a tool used to enforce the monopoly on the use of force, fits
nicely into this framework. Asymmetric disarmament would have the same effect as
charging the losing party. Alternatively this would be considered a threat-motivated
grant using Boulding’s (1981) work. So, if fear progresses, by undertaking a threat

24
motivated exchange such as disarmament, a group will become protective, and will find
ways to arm or rearm themselves. If the group perceives a block from others to
protective weapons, they will see it as an affront. They may also believe the other side is
actively trying to keep them down, which they may well be, leading the losing party to
the desire for their own dominance (Lederach, 2005).
Disarmament, and variable levels of access to armaments, changes the resources
available to a given group in the post-conflict landscape. Dresden (2015) labels these
differences in access to resources and armaments as the specific and convertible
capabilities. Specific capabilities are those useful mostly for violence. Convertible
capabilities on the other hand, are those which can be applied to a variety of social
mobilizations5. Dresden also finds that while horizontal variation in capabilities leads to
dominance, horizontal equality in capabilities almost necessarily leads to pluralism.
From disarmament and non-integration, one can derive a sense of disenfranchisement or
othering, particularly if it is asymmetric, or one group has greater capabilities.
If the motivations of the other side are not properly understood, then we easily fall
prey to the temptation to label the other as “evil” (Cole, 2004), and deepen the othering.
Othering might seem an unimportant detail, but it is key to how the in-group justifies
conflict with the out-group. This is important both within the conflict and from the
outsider perspective. Nevertheless, the moniker of “evil” is used quite prolifically,
especially when describing one’s opponents, a term recently used to describe terrorists.
Such a label is harmful to the peace process, as it is used as an excuse for not
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empathizing with the concerns of the other group. Only when each side can understand
the other’s justification for conflict, will they be able to resolve their differences.
Thus the three methods that are likely to be the most effective are security
powersharing, thirdness, and the rejection of the label of evil. Use, or lack thereof, of
these methods, can be evaluated in addition to certain theoretical frameworks to
understand where conflicts arise, or perpetuate, from. The first two, or lack of the third,
being likely to promote structural violence, which may lead to direct violence, but at a
minimum is not ideal itself.
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METHODOLOGY

To accomplish the aforementioned goal of demonstrating the problems with the
predominant views of peace, and the methods with which they are implemented, this
research will use the comparative method (Ragin, 1981). Ragin claims that society is the
most common unit of analysis in social science. Nonetheless, many scholars do not
adequately define what they consider to be a society. Society is a valid unit of analysis,
but this definition only restates the conclusion as its own raison d’être. Thus, should a
society be the unit of analysis, then a society must by properly defined. Wallerstein
(1974) on the other hand, would claim that the only valid unit of analysis is the historical
social system, contemporarily the capitalist world-economy. According to Ragin (1981),
Wallerstein’s uses the system as his theoretical unit of analysis, all the while relying upon
lower order units as his data unit of analysis. Thus, while Wallerstein’s extreme example
situates the comparisons within a greater system, he is still performing comparative
analysis, often of states, to come to his conclusions.
The strength of the comparative method rests in its ability to explore a set of
convergent causal conditions. This can be useful in two situations. First, when causes
are complex, the comparative method can point out these convergent conditions where
quantitative analysis might achieve spurious results. Second, the comparative method is
helpful again where quantitative methods are not, as it can operate on a very small
number of cases and still produce valid conclusions. Essentially in both cases, there are a
large number of variables, but specific combinations of these yield particular situations.
Here the unit of analysis is the scope of a conflict, rather than society. For the
purposes of this research, a conflict is defined as two or more groups of people whose
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disagreements with each other, within or mostly within a single country, become violent.
This definition is reductive, but also inclusive. However, under this definition, each and
every instance of violence between peoples would be a separate conflict. Thusly, this
research will adopt the definition that a conflict is a grouping, in time and space, of the
aforementioned individual conflicts. Further, this grouping must maintain the logic of
similarity, such that a grouping of conflicts, particularly if not temporally and or spatially
similar, must include the same groups. Additionally, this study will also only be
comparing internal conflicts, rather than inter-state conflicts. In both cases, the dyad is
asymmetric, with one territorial entity and one non-state entity.
While the possibility exists for a conflict to restart at a different time and in a
different place, the conflict often involves the same two or more groups. However, if the
groups involved are not the same, it cannot be the same conflict. It is also quite possible
that a conflict will persist, with the same groups, yet have very different names and
structure at different points in the conflict. In Cambodia for instance, the earliest
communist guerrillas later became a political party, then the ruling regime, and then
reverted to resistance. The other side of the conflict, consisted of the North Vietnamese
guerilla forces operating in Cambodia during the Vietnam War, then the united
Vietnamese Army, and then the pro-Vietnam government installed by the Vietnamese.
Under a different definition, Cambodia might be considered a series or even simple
scattering of conflicts, but for this research it is considered a single conflict. Notably,
while the US-Vietnam War is very strongly related, it will not be considered a part of the
Cambodian conflict (Curtis, 1998; Kiernan, 2014).
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Finally, the term “political change” must be properly defined. For the purposes of
this research, political change is restricted to the periphery of the world economy.
Additionally, for this project, it must be change that yields significant turmoil, or
upheaval. For example, if a new president were elected or a law were changed this would
not count as political change, while a coup would, or a policy change that disenfranchised
a group of people would, such as banning the use of a local language in favor of a
national one.

Design

The purpose of this research is to demonstrate the problems of the prevailing
methods and understandings of peace, particularly where they may lead to structural
violence. To this end two small but well known conflicts with differing outcomes are
compared, namely Rwanda and Cambodia. First however, it will be demonstrated that
structural violence is linked to political turmoil in the periphery of the world economy.
The interactions of other variables with Infant Mortality Rates, as a measure of structural
violence, in the two conflicts are more complex, but the importance of the link to the
periphery is reinforced by the numerous points of agreement, where each of these
countries has a similar relationship with the world as a whole. Thus comparing the
agreements and their implementation will be useful in determining the problems that led
to the varied outcomes. Many variables between the two countries have similar values (or
agreement), making it a good comparison, but most telling will be the differences (or
disagreements in the variables). In order to understand the effects these differences may
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have had, the terms of the agreements will be measured against the frameworks of
Lederach (1999), Boulding (1980), and to a smaller extent Call (2012).
Lederach’s (1999) and Boulding’s (1980) intertwining theoretical work will be
useful in determining how certain parts of the peace agreement or implementation will
affect all sides. Any of the stipulations may be seen as an economic grant reliant on one
of Boulding’s (1980) three types of power, and more specific to structural violence, are
the more dichotomous love and fear actions, and the processes of othering. Within
specific sections on military integration, Call’s (2012) research will be relied upon to
extrapolate likely proximal and distal benefits and costs of specific programs. Based upon
preliminary comparison, one variable stands out as clearly different between the two.
That is, the question of actor legitimacy in negotiations. While both sides were
considered legitimate in the Cambodian conflict, the same cannot be said of the Rwandan
one. While a set of hypotheses6, can be drawn from these, more cases will have to be
examined to determine if this is a pervasive bias, or simply an anomaly.

Points of agreement and disagreement which play no causal role

Most of the agreement between the variables, and even a number of the
disagreements, do not play an important causal role with regard to the dependent
variable; confirming that the comparison of the two conflicts is a valid one, and
demonstrating the similar relationship to the core of the world economy. Similarities,

6
H1: If each member of a conflict dyad is recognized as having legitimate territory then the rights
to armament and military organization will be retained in the peace agreement.
H2: If one member of a conflict dyad is not recognized as having legitimate territory then the
rights to armament and military organization will not be retained for that member in the peace agreement.
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and differences deemed to be unimportant, will be discussed later in this chapter, after the
discussion of the rationale behind the case selections. The similarities are used to justify
the cases' validity for comparison using the method of difference (Ragin, 1981).
In addition to the aforementioned questions of cleavage and actor legitimacy,
there are several points of agreement. These points lend validity to the comparative
study, and will be detailed below. Nevertheless, there are a number of points where the
two cases do not agree. These might normally render the study too weak, but do not due
to certain underlying similarities. Both groups will be discussed as to whether they can
be considered as playing no significant causal role in the outcome of the dependent
variable.
First among points of agreement is dyad symmetry. Both conflicts occurred
between a recognized state and a non-state entity7. Each of the reigning governments
were recognized during the 1980s, while the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the Khmer
Rouge held no territory through which to be recognized. Second is temporality. In each
conflict the country gained independence from a European colonial power in the 1950s,
with various outbreaks of violence thereafter. Additionally, each underwent a peace
process and subsequent agreement in the early 1990s.
Third are the analogous relationships. In each case, the country had similar
relationships with regional powers, and far away powers. Rwanda was regionally
peripheral to Uganda, and had colonial relationships with Belgium and Germany.
Cambodia was regionally peripheral to Vietnam, and had a similar colonial relationship

7

While the pro-Vietnam government was not recognized by the West, it had control of the territory and
was recognized by many other states, most notably the Soviet Union et al, and the officially recognized (by
the West) government held no territory and was in exile (Curtis, 1998; Kiernan, 2014).

31
with France (Prebisch, 1949). Fourth, is the presence of a non-state entity in exile. In
Rwanda the RPF was created by exiled Rwandan nationals in refugee camps in Uganda.
In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge held no territory after 1978, and operated across the Thai
border (Curtis, 1998; Kiernan, 2014).
Finally, both conflicts exhibited a foreign invasion. In Cambodia, the Vietnamese
invaded after unifying Vietnam in 1978. In Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front
invaded in 1990 (Smith, 1995). These, and the aforementioned points of agreement
which could be considered independent variables, are used to validate the salience of the
points of disagreement to come (Ragin, 1981).
In addition to these points of agreement are the two points of disagreement that
have no significant outcome on the dependent variable. These are the relationships
between the country and their respective colonial powers, and the regional context in
which each country existed. Both can be regarded as unimportant in this study due to
their analogous relationships. Both countries were peripheral to Europe, and to their
more dominant neighbors, and so are similar despite their actual distance, and different
colonial powers. Due to their underlying similarities, these will also be used to validate
the salience of disagreements (Ragin, 1981).

Case selection

Both Rwanda and Cambodia underwent peace talks and subsequently had
agreements in the early 1990s, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union. In both cases,
the United Nations was heavily involved in the process. The countries are far apart, but
both states can be considered peripheral within their own regions, as well as the world.
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The simplest explanation of the core-periphery relationship is offered by Wallerstein
(2004, p. 11), via Prebisch (1949); that it is expected by powerful [core] states that the
weaker [peripheral] states will follow an established world order; to open their borders to
the goods and materials of the powerful states, without granting reciprocal access or a
voice in the establishment of the world order. Regionally, both Rwanda and Cambodia
are weak compared to their neighbors, such as Uganda and Vietnam, and subject to the
will of the UN, the United States, China, Europe, and the Soviet bloc.
A possibly problematic difference is the cause of the conflict. While any conflict
has multiple causes, it may often be linked to one cleavage more than others. In the case
of Rwanda this is upon ethnic lines, while in Cambodia it is upon class lines. The
cleavage difference is not as severe as it might seem however, as the Rwandan ethnic
divide is recent, artificial, and originally class based. In the 19th century, German
officials administering the territory selected as leaders the cattle herders who became
known as the Tutsi. The bulk of the population though, was engaged in plant-based
agriculture, and was generally poorer (Paris, 2004). What the Germans, and later the
Belgians, did in the name of hegemonic stability, created an ethnic divide. In normal
circumstances however, ethnic divides are much older, as each group has a separate
heritage. For instance, the Greeks and Turks have been at odds for far longer than few
generations, even if at a certain point they too shared certain parts of history. Too the
Kurds with Sunni, Shia, and Turk. Thus it is concluded that this difference in cleavage
does not constitute the problem it might.
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Figure 1
Variable comparisons
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INFANT MORTALITY: A DEMONSTRABLY USEFUL TOOL TO GAUGE
STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE

In an effort to measure how structural violence can play into conflict resolution, a
proxy variable was necessary. Some scholars have previously attempted this by treating
immediate deaths as the result of direct violence, while other premature deaths are
considered the result of structural violence (Høivik & Galtung, 1971; Köhler & Alcock,
1976). Premature deaths are not measured simply as a number of lives lost, rather,
Galtung and Høivik (1971) to measure the number of years lost. Alternatively, Koehler
and Alcock (1976) measure the number of lives lost due to lack of access to amenities.
While more specific in cause, this method does not account for age at death as does the
previous one.
This research however, is more concerned with daily stresses and structural
inequality than adult mortality, often the result of direct conflict. The most demonstrative
variable of stress on the populace, that is also widely available over several decades, is
infant mortality. Infant mortality can often be seen increasing for a short time as a result
of the frequent stresses of conflict and its concurrent hardships, as well as the stresses of
political upheaval and class differences, especially in the periphery of the world
economy.
Infant mortality has decreased in every country for which there is data in the
World Bank database, which tracked the rate from 1960 to 2013 (World Bank, 2015).
Even in countries, like Sierra Leone, where it is estimated that infant mortality remains
above 100 deaths per 1000 live births within the first year of life, the rate has declined
from nearly 1 in 4 fifty years earlier. The rate of Sierra Leone is in stark contrast to
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Iceland, which has the lowest infant mortality rate with 1.6 deaths before age 1 per one
thousand children born. There are also more than 60 countries of the 190 listed with
single-digit per thousand rates. While much of this trend can be attributed to the
availability of medical advances, the short term-changes during times of upheaval denote
stress and lack of access to resources (World Bank, 2015).
In addition to the differences between countries, infant mortality has also declined
at varied rates based on class. In many cases certain groups have retained high rates of
infant mortality despite the national level declining. When high rates are retained in the
face of overall decline, these high rates are suggested to be the result of either a lack of
capital assets, a lack of social mobility, or simply a time-lag (Antonovsky and Bernstein,
1977). The first two of these could easily be correlated with structural violence, while
the third is vague as to the cause, but suggests that it will improve for every class given
enough time.
For example, the rate of black infant mortality in the United States has not only
been historically higher than white infant mortality, the gap has broadened further over
the last few decades (Singh and Yu, 1995, p. 964). This however, is not wholly due to
racial difference, but rather the average socioeconomic differences between the two
groups. Even controlling for this, black infant mortality rates remain higher than white
rates, indicating structural violence (Williams and Collins, 1995).
As shown in figure 2, the world infant mortality rate has declined from above 120
as of 1960, to below 40 per thousand by the year 2013. Even in the case of Sierra Leone,
which retains the highest rate, there has been a steady decline, as illustrated in Figure 3.
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Despite the steady decline shown by most countries, as well as world and regional
aggregates, spikes and plateaus can be seen in a number of individual countries during
times they were undergoing political change. Such significant political change in the
periphery is most clearly illustrated by a number of post-Soviet states in the early and
mid-1990s, as these states had increases in infant mortality rates at the same approximate
time due to similar changes from the breakup. Figure 4 shows the aggregated post-Soviet
states, Figure 5shows the same after removing Romania which proved anomalous, while
Figure 6 shows the trajectory of select cases within the group.
While the Soviet breakup did not represent cases of othering, with the exception
of Yugoslavia, due to its low IMR at the time of the change, the effect of non-violent
political upheaval is clearer than it is in cases with higher IMRs. For instance, Sierra
Leone underwent very large political upheavals, and experienced large-scale structural
violence. However, the IMR was and is so high that the change is visually indiscernible.
Thus the post-Soviet cases make a good control to demonstrate the usefulness of this tool
in the periphery of the world economy, as the low levels of infant mortality make the
increases extremely noticeable.
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Figure 6 Post-Soviet states mortality rates, infant, disaggregated
(World Bank, 2015)

As Figure 6 shows, each of these countries began to experience an increase in
their infant mortality rates as early as 1988, but had seen a reduction again by 1996. The
obvious exception was Romania, which increased instead from 1984 to 1988 as a result
of an austerity program designed to liquidate national debt. Though this program had an
adverse effect on the population, it succeeded in removing all debt by 1987, allowing
Romania an easier transition after the 1989 breakup (Roper, 2000). Notably, these
countries already had very low levels of infant mortality in 1960, as compared to the
world average, and despite the large relative spikes, conditions were still not terribly
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severe during this time, as is visible in Figure 5. These comparisons show that infant
mortality rates, in at least some cases, exhibit sensitivity to short and medium-term
political change, when the countries are located in the periphery.
While the former Soviet Republics show increases due to the sociopolitical
changes of the Soviet collapse, Sub-Saharan Africa shows similar spikes and plateaus due
to conflict and regime changes, but as a group it is much harder to distinguish underlying
processes, as they did not all occur at roughly the same time, as happened in the Soviet
Republics.

140
120
100
80

Conflict Affected SubSahara CSS Mortality rate,
infant (per 1,000 live births)
SP.DYN.IMRT.IN

60
40
20

1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014

0

Figure 7 Conflict affected Sub-Sahara mortality rate, infant
(World Bank, 20155)

As is visible in Figure 7, there is a plateau in the infant mortality rates of conflictAffected Sub-Saharan Africa, but due to the time differences of each conflict the
aggregated graph is not very representative of the local situation, unlike in Figures 5 and
6, which show multiple spikes at the same approximate time. Figure 8 shows a selection
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of such countries with varying degrees of relative increase in infant mortality. None of
these is as prominent as Rwanda however, set aside in Figure 9.
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Figure 8 Conflict affected Sub-Sahara mortality rates, infant, select disaggregated
(World Bank, 2015)

Rwanda shows not one but two very dramatic relative increases in infant
mortality. This represents the two separate conflicts involving the same two groups.
Immediately to the South the similarly peopled Burundi experienced these same conflicts,
as can be seen in Figure 10, but the increases were not as severe, and neither was the
subsequent decrease as fast, remaining significantly higher to this day. Burundi
experienced the stresses, but not either the armed conflict, or the positive trend once
tensions were alleviated.
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Figure 9 Rwanda mortality rate, infant
(World Bank, 2015)
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Figure 10 Burundi mortality rate, infant
(World Bank, 2015)
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Figure 11 Hutu-Tutsi conflict mortality rate, infant
(World Bank, 2015)
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Figure 12 Liberia mortality rate, infant
(World Bank, 2015)
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Figure 13 Cambodia mortality rate, infant
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Even combining the two states into a single conflict graph does not greatly
attenuate the twin-peaked slope. Compared to other conflicts around the world, this one
seems to stand out. Other conflicts show a plateau or shallow slope, rather than this more
extreme change. Figures 12 and 13 show the most common conflict profile.
Numerous other conflicts show this same general profile, with a general
downward slope followed by a modest rise or plateau, but somehow the Hutu-Tutsi
conflict, particularly in Rwanda, is much different, including its rapid improvement
following the more recent outbreak.
This begs the question of why Rwanda differs. For instance, the United Nations
undertook disarmament initiatives during the post-conflict phase in Liberia, but not in
Rwanda, correlating with a much more rapid and effective change. This and other
differences may have had an either positive or negative effect on the peace process, and
warrants further and more in depth comparison.
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In Burundi, the same conflict did not have so dramatic a decline in infant
mortality following the end of the more recent outbreak. Due to the much higher rate of
infant mortality in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide, the rate may have activated
another mechanism which caused the rate to fall. High infant mortality at the time of a
peace agreement has been shown to be statistically significant, increasing the likelihood
of continued and more expansive negotiation, rather than minimal negotiations
preserving the status quo (Joshi & Quinn, 2015), and could therefore have improved
conditions, and reduced structural violence and IMRs. This concept is reminiscent of
Mouffe’s (2005) work on political conflict mentioned earlier, as it keeps the group from
accepting a less inclusive agreement, and reinforces pluralism.
In Cambodia, unlike Rwanda, the infant mortality rate does not follow the conflict
as readily. For instance, the rate of deaths within the first year of life continued to drop
drastically from year to year even as the adult mortality rate spiked during the “Year
Zero” and beyond9. Indeed it did not even plateau until nearly five years after the 1978
Vietnamese invasion. Then, as the peace agreement was implemented, infant mortality
rates rose for several years before reducing slightly year to year until 2000, when it began
to fall at a higher rate. This odd behavior still seems to indicate structural violence, but
perhaps more along the order of post-Soviet states than that of Rwanda.

9

It is estimated that Cambodia had a population of 7.89 million in 1975, and would have grown to 8.2
million by the end of 1978, under normal conditions. At the end of 1978, the population is estimated at
6.36 million (Kiernan, 2003).
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
According to the Uppsala Conflict Database Program’s (UCDP) Peace Agreement
Dataset v. 2.0, 1975-2011, there were DDR programs and military integration programs
as a part of both the Arusha and Paris Accords (Högbladh, 2011). While this initially
appeared problematic, upon further investigation the programs and implementation in
place were substantively different, despite their apparent similarities. Due to the number
of unique cases the UCDP conflict dataset was attempting to catalogue, the necessary
criteria for dichotomous variables were quite broad, and nonspecific. Both the Paris and
Arusha Accords were sparse at best, with the exception of military integration in Rwanda
(UN, 1996; USIP, 2002).
Neither case exhibited a full-fledged DDR program. In Rwanda, there was a UN
mission sent to restrict the flow of arms across the Ugandan border to the RPF, but this
embargo did not disarm, and preceded the agreement. In addition, a force of 16000
troops was allowed to remain in service, while the remaining soldiers were promised a
small severance at some future date, by the Arusha Accords (UN, 1996). In Cambodia the
program was even weaker. There was a stipulation that 70% of the forces of each side
demobilize, but weapons used by the demobilized troops would be turned over to the
remaining troops, rather than confiscated (USIP, 2002). This exchange was sufficient for
the UCDP, but as no weapons would be taken from the militaries of either side, there
would be no change in the specific capabilities of the factions (Dresden, 2015).
The plans for military integration demonstrate the most marked difference
between the two agreements. While each agreement stipulated a restructuring of the
military, which is the UCDP requirement, the stipulations were much different. In the
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Arusha Accords for Rwanda, there was a very specific plan to almost immediately
integrate the militaries. Half of the enlisted personnel were sourced from the RPF, and
half from the Rwandan National Army. The enlisted personnel were not to be
individually integrated, but were adjacent to those from the other side. Both groups had a
mixture of officers, with a 60% to 40% mix, favoring the Rwandan National Army.
These changes were implemented in 1994, less than a year after the peace agreement
(UN, 1996).
In the Paris Accords for Cambodia however, the plan was not so detailed. As
mentioned previously, the forces of each side were reduced by 70%. This was considered
sufficient to qualify within the Peace Agreement Dataset, but actually made no mention
of integration. There was no specified timeline for demobilization, nor for the only
implied integration. The parallel demobilization, no matter when it was finished, was to
last at least three years after the agreement, until the 1993 elections yielded a new
political body to take over the military (USIP, 2002).
The stark difference in timeline of each expected implementation may be the most
telling. The Arusha Accords were never fully implemented, as the Presidential Guard
and Hutu militias began killing and maiming Tutsis in 1994, at which point the RPF
resumed their invasion, and eventually succeeded in supplanting the reigning
government. According to Paris (2004), the Arusha Accords failed specifically because
of discontent with the terms.
Too rapid of change has been shown to be problematic in other areas as well.
Paris (2004) demonstrates that rapid liberalization after the end of a conflict leads to
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ethnic dominance10. In Rwanda the looming military integration would have exacerbated
fears of such dominance, through mechanisms analogous to those at work in overly rapid
liberalization. Additionally, the discontent would have deepened the othering, moving
the metaphorical water toward the fearcoast, despite the intention of the terms to be
integrative.
While many parties may have been skeptical or afraid in Cambodia, the longer
timeline and lack of specificity allowed for a slow easing of tensions. In Rwanda though,
the rapid change was more like panic while approaching a cliff. Both countries were
expected to experience a large number of military aged males to be demobilized, but in
Cambodia it would not happen so abruptly. The Arusha Accords did promise a small
lump sum to each demobilized soldier, it did not correct for the rapidity (UN, 1996).
Though the pro-government militias were the ones who restarted the conflict in
Rwanda, due to their discontent, the RPF were also given reason to be unhappy with their
terms. First, the UN did not recognize the RPF as a legitimate entity, with rights to a
military and armaments for defense like they do for states. This is particularly evidenced
by the pre-accord UN mission to create an arms embargo on the RPF, by blocking
shipments across the Cambodian Border (UN, 1996). No embargo was placed on the
Rwandan state, as it was considered to have an inherent right to defense because of its
membership in the states-system. In Cambodia, despite the asymmetry of the conflict,
each side was supported by a faction of the international community, and thus avoided
was treated as a completely legitimate actor within the Westphalian states-system.

10

Ethnic dominance is linked to agreement failure (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).
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Additionally, the Paris Accords for Cambodia proclaim the emerging state to be
completely neutral in world affairs, with the inherent right to self-defense, and all the
organization and equipment to achieve self-defense. The lack of an embargo in
Cambodia raises the possibility that the embargo in Rwanda was not put in order to
prevent further violence, but to protect the member of the system from an extrasystemic
entity. This is an example of Dietrich’s (2006) Phobos, where the system acts in a phobic
manner to preserve itself. Here the world system punished the non-state actor, resulting
in structural violence, not because it had a less legitimate claim, but because it was not a
member of the club.
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CONCLUSION

This comparative study of the conflicts in Rwanda and Cambodia yielded three
important results. First, is that infant mortality rates do indeed seem to be linked to short
and medium term political change in the periphery of the world economy, and are
sensitive to economic conditions. Specific research is still warranted to ensure that a
particular change in IMR is not caused by some other condition, but the link is
nonetheless substantial. Were an intervening variable responsible for this, it is unlikely
to have shown up so widely across the former Soviet Republics, and not confined to a
single region. Instead it shows up in multiple countries in the Baltic and Black Sea
regions, and in the Balkans at the same time. Additionally, while Romania experienced
an early elevation of infant mortality rates, neighboring and culturally similar Moldova
experienced it at the same time as the other soviet republics, rather than with Romania.
Were the increase caused by a local factor, it is unlikely that Moldova, or even Ukraine,
would have been isolated from it. Instead it appears that Romania’s early economic
reform led to the difference in timelines, beginning the same process a few years earlier.
Second, is that rapid military integration appears to cause fear and discontent, due
to the possibility of faction dominance within the ranks. This result appears to parallel
the problems associated with liberalization as outlined by Paris, (2004). Third is the
apparent differential in treatment of those actors considered to be legitimate by portions
of the international community. The clearest delineation is that states will generally
retain the right to self-defense, and the personnel and equipment necessary for selfdefense. Non-state entities will not retain this right, and at best will be allowed to
integrate their personnel with that of the state. Non-disarmament, and the retention of
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explicitly recognized rights to self-defense are representative of a move toward a more
peaceful and just society, where direct and indirect violence will be reduced, including
structural violence. This hinges on the concept of trust and respect between the parties,
rather than fear-motivated disarmament. Or as integrative exchanges instead of threat
based ones.
The weakness of these results comes from the small number of cases being
compared. While the comparative method was useful to demonstrate the complex
combination of variables within these specific conflicts, the use of this method damages
the applicability of the results to other conflicts. Additionally, the research relies on the
work of Boulding (1990), Dietrich (2006), and Lederach (2005) to make assumptions
about how specific parts of the conflict and the peace agreements made the combatants
feel. The work of these scholars may be generalizable, but it would strengthen the
assumptions made here if interview and survey research were done with former
combatants. That however, is not in the scope of the current research project. One final
consideration, is that the conflict in Cambodia was not as fresh in the minds of the people
as the one in Rwanda. Zartman (2005) has shown that conflicts may need to reach a level
of “ripeness” before they can be successfully resolved; however, ripeness is only
determinable after the fact, and Zartman gives no generalizable method with which to
judge the ripeness of a conflict11.

11

Lederach (2003) feels that this approach has a few weaknesses. Firstly, it expects predictability; yet too
often the signs of said ripeness are not apparent until the conflict ends successfully. Second, this ripeness is
relative. While the conflict may be the at the right stage for one group, or the other, or the mediator, the
likelihood that it will be ripe for all parties at the same time is low. He also sarcastically calls it “cherry
picking” (p. 31) The ripeness metaphor makes it seem so easy; if done at the right time mediation and
intervention are guaranteed to succeed, falling prey to over-simplification and failing to aid in the
amelioration of conflict (Lederach, 2003; Zartman, 1985). Additionally, the ripeness metaphor sounds too
much like the communist claim that capitalism must continue to its end, just as the conflict must continue
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The result that may have the deepest implications, is the differential treatment of
actors based upon the Westphalian states-system. If this differential treatment leads to a
recurrence of civil wars, the system may come into question. By this system the
international community judges who has the right to rule, but there is a long history of
Western imposition of statehood. For instance, the Middle East was divided not
according to national lines, but according to the interests of European powers during the
forced dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Upon independence in the mid-20th century
however, the states were not allowed to determine their own identities and borders, but
were expected to uphold those imposed by Europe after World War I. One of the most
salient examples of this is Kurdish nationalism, and the relative stability of this region,
despite nonrecognition of Kurdistan and the instability of nearby recognized states.
Despite the wide spread and long history of the Westphalian states-system, some
scholars have begun to challenge the validity of its origin, let alone the application and
interpretation of it (Kayaoglu, 2010). Instead of officially creating the states-system, as
we are normally led to believe, the story of the Peace of Westphalia seems to serve the
same purpose as the story of Eirene-Peace as the product-daughter of Zeus-Power and
Themis-Order. While the international community may have forsaken myths of titans
and deities as a source of their institutional heritage, the new order comes with its own
mythology to justify its own phobic security of the institution (Dietrich, 2006). This
mythology however, prevents the system from recognizing relatively stable regions like

until it is properly ripe: Either deepening the disparities until they are so great they have to be overthrown,
or allowing conflict to continue until both sides are so sick of it they have no qualms with change. While
these claims may have some truth to them, they are not prescriptive (Marx & Engels, 1848, p. 21).
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Iraqi Kurdistan, or Somaliland, as legitimate. This non-recognition by the system, leads
to structural and direct violence through ideological encapsulation (Della Porta, 2013).
In the future, further work into the question of actor legitimacy, other indicators
of structural violence, and the study of integration timing will be useful. Regarding
legitimacy, it would be helpful to analyze which provisions of peace agreements are
levied against non-state actors, compared with state actors. For structural violence, study
of particularly sensitive indicators, such as preterm birth rates, low birth weight rates, and
rates of cesarean births during times of conflict, peace, and political upheaval, will be
helpful where there is available data (Bodalal et al, 2014). These affects seem most
noticeable in the periphery of the world economy. For rapidity an analysis of integration
timelines could be compared to the rate of peace agreement failure or success.
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